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VIETNAM 
Mr. COOPER. Mr. President, the chief 
issue before our country continues to be 
Vietnam. It lnftuences our ability to man-
age effectively all our concerns and pri-
orities, domestic and foreign. A progres-
sion of events since 1954, and even be-
fore, has carried us to this place. I do 
not believe that It ls inevitable that 
events of our decisions must continue to 
carry us deeper into an ever increasing 
involvement in VIetnam. 
On May 15, I made a proposal in the 
Senate, which I hoped would enable our 
Government to break out of the rigid 
cycle of force and counterforce which 
ha.s not brought negotiation or peace, but 
only a steadily enlarging war. 
My propOBltlon wa.s that the United 
States should confine Its bombing-in 
support of our troops-to 1nflltratlon 
routes near the demllltarized zone where 
men and supplies enter South VIetnam 
over the 17th parallel, or from LaOB and 
Cambodia.. 
The key of the proposal wa.s that the 
action of the United States sllould be 
without precondition-without the re-
quirement of sbme parallel reciprocity 
by the North Vietnamese; without stages 
of cessation; without fixing terminal 
dates; and not centered upon religious 
days, because the purpose of the pause 
is unclear. 
The unconditional cessation of bomb-
ing ha.s been the consistent and Indispen-
sable requirement of North Vietnam for 
negotiations. I do not believe there will 
be negotiations until the bombing stops, 
and uncondition3.lly_ 
I made the proposal as a way for our 
Government to determine whether an 
unconditional cessation of the bombing 
of North Vietnam would lead to nego-
tiations, a.s has been reported by many 
official and private channels, including 
Secretary General of the U.N., U Thant 
and Premier Kosygin of the Soviet 
Union. My proposal was made as an al-
ternative to an escalation of the bombing, 
an escalation of forces, and of the total 
war, which could reach a point when 
North VIetnam would be compelled to 
ask the Soviet bloc for volunteers and 
Communist China to come to Its aid, and 
when China would Intervene to prevent 
the defeat of Its Communist neighbor. 
Above all, it was-and Is today-a pro-
posal for negotiation, and for an honor-
able peace, which our country, with the 
assurance of Its va.st power, and with the 
conviction of its desire for an honorable 
peace, can make. 
Of course, such a cessation entails seri-
ous risks, and they are apparent, but they 
are risks that the United States can take. 
It Is difficult to belleve that the United 
States, with Its overwhelming power, 
could not protect the security of our 
troops. As I pointed out on May 15, the 
risks are not as great as a continuing and 
expanding war-with its rising casualties 
and oost-the increased support by the 
Soviet Union to North VIetnam, the pos-
sibility 'Of intervention by Communist 
China, and, if that should occur, the pos-
sibility of a third world war, with con-
sequences one can scarcely contemplate. 
No one can say that our 1n1tlatlve 
would be successful, but the retraction 
of bombing-like a. curtain of fire pulled 
back-would have to be recognized by 
North Vietnam, and Its purpose known 
by the world. 
The decision for peace-not war-will 
then have been made by our country. 
The choice of peace or war will then pass 
to the North Vietnamese and its Com-
munist supporters. 
My proposal of May 15 received wide 
support from many sources-from Mem-
bers of the Senate, including the ma-
jority leader, Senator MANSFIELD, from 
the news media, and people throughout 
the country. A thoughtful proposal for 
cessation--although differing in some 
important respects from the one I have 
ma.d~has been made by Representa-
tive Morse and seven other Members of 
the House. 
In referring to our distinguished ma-
jority leader, Senator MANSFIELD, I have 
done so because I know that In 1954, 
when it was suggested that the United 
States then either send troops into South 
Vietnam or use its A1r Force In support 
of the French at Dlenbienphu, he pointed 
out the danger of the involvement of the 
United States in that cotmtry. And year 
after year he has continued to point out 
the danger of further involvement. 
.I have not mentioned in this speech 
the suggestion of Senator MANSFIELD 
that this matter be refen-ed to the Ge-
neva Conference or to the United Na-
tions, a proposal I have supported, be-
cause I wanted to place my emphasis 
upon the unconditional cessation of 
bombing, which I believe Is indispensa-
ble f.:>r the start of negotiations. But 1f 
cessation of bombing should occur, and 
negotiations are not possible, then, of 
course, his position-his urging to sub-
mit the question of the war in Vietnam 
to the United Nations-should be sup-
ported by our Government and by Con-
gress, without reservation. 
But soon after May 15, the attention of 
the country was focused on the Middle 
East. A war has been fought. It was 
mercifully short, but It brought costly 
destruction and the loss of many lives-
including American lives. It has not 
brought peace or security to the Mideast. 
The underlying problems remain to be 
settled. And as with any war today, there 
wa.s concern that It would involve an in-
crea.sing number of countries, Including 
our own. 
The conflict In the Mideast raised 
again, during that period of crisis, the 
prospect of a confrontation between the 
United States and the Soviet Union-one 
which may have been averted or at least 
lessened by the speed of the Israel vic-
tory. 
The debates in the Security Council 
and General Assembly of the United Na-
tions, the conference between President 
Johnson and Premier Kosygln at Gla.ss-
boro, once again laid bare with awesome 
clarity the delicate balance between the 
two great powers. There have been 
incidents only recently which warn that 
this balance Is dellcate indeed and could 
be upset. Soviet naval vessels have har-
assed our ships, a.nd Soviet merchant 
ships have been strafed In North Viet-
nam harbors. Doubts about the inten-
tions of each other, and concern for secu-
rity are leading- and I believe inexor-
ably- to the establlshment of antiballis-
tic missile systems in the Soviet Union 
and the United States. These develop-
ments, and the possibility of the con-
frontation about which we were so con-
cerned during the Mideast crisis, dem-
onstrate the Importance of a settlement 
in Vietnam. 
In making this statement, I do not 
place our country on the same plane as 
the Soviet Union. I know that the Presi-
dent and the United States sincerely de-
sire peace in Vietnam, and I am not cer-
tain that the Soviet Union does. 
But despite the dangerous confronta-
tion In the Middle Ea.st-a greater war 
was averted. President Johnson acted 
with restraint and statesmanship. The 
Soviet Union did not intervene with its 
Mike Mansfield Papers, Series 21, Box 43, Folder 71, Mansfield Library, University of Montana
810328 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD- SENATE July 27, 1967 
forces after the war began. The Security 
CouncU was able to agree on a. resolution 
for a cease-fire which was accepted. 
There is recognition that the basic prob-
lems of the Mideast must be met. And 
there grew up at the time the belief, or at 
least hope in the world, that steps can be 
taken to find peaceful solutions 1n other 
dangerous areas, including Southeast 
Asia.. 
The U.S. Government ha.s reached 
another difficult stage of the war in Viet-
nam. 
It is reported, and I believe accurately, 
that the decision has been made to send 
additional troops to Vietnam. I do not 
question the military basis upon which 
the request for additional troops was 
made. I do not question the desire and 
duty of the President of the United States 
and the Congress and the American peo-
ple to protect our troops. And If the call 
is made, I shall SUPport It as I have sup-
ported our troops In past years. 
But these decisions deal with military 
policy and with war, and implicit in them 
1s the prospect of additional calls for 
more men, more supplies, and more 
bombing 1! the war continues. 
All this may come, but before It does, 
I urge our Government to take a pe.th 
toward negotiations and pee.ce which I 
do not believe has been fully tried-to 
cease unconditionally the bombing of 
North VIetnam. It bears rlsk-but one 
that the strength of our country-great, 
free, and humane--and the conscience of 
our people compel us to take. 
Some country someday, must show 
the way from the morass of wars which 
Is threatening our security and the peace 
of the world. I do not know of any other 
country that has the power, as well as 
the obligation of leadership and the con-
cern to lead the way, except the United 
States. I hope that the United States will 
lead the way. 
Mr. CASE. Mr. President, '1'\.111 the Sen-
ator yield? 
Mr. COOPER. I yield. 
Mr. CASE. Mr. President, the Impor-
tance of the statement which the Senator 
from Kentucky has made cannot be ex-
aggerated. Because of Its Inherent sound-
ness, It is something that the adminis-
tration must take into account. 
Mr. President, to my deep regret the 
suggestion made by the Senator from 
Kentucky and others, Including the ma-
jority leader, ha.s not been given consid-
eration by the administration: or, if It 
ha,s, we have not been advised that this 
Is so. 
I wish to emphasize this point as 
strongly a.s I can by relating the colloquy 
I had with the Secretary ot Defense a.t 
a. hearing In which he was a witness be-
for the Committee on Foreign Relations, 
as follows: 
Senator CASE. Mr. Chalnnan, there Ia juat 
one other thing, a.nd tha.t Ia with relation 
to the bomblng. Bena.tor Cooper ha.a been 
m.aklng suggeattona a.bout limitation of 
bombing, and ma.ny other membt!rs or Con-
gr668 have done tha~I use him a.a an ex-
ample. I myself have stated that bombing 
of North Vletnam ought to be limited to that 
which haa a. substantial or significant t'ffect 
upon the movement o! men or auppllt'a lnto 
South Vletnam. The decision a.pparently hna 
been made by the Administration to conttnue 
with the general present program; le that 
correct? 
Secretary McNAMARA. Senator Cue, I do no~ 
want to !orecaat future milltary operattona. 
Senator CAS!:. But this I read ln the news-
pa.pers, that the U.S. won't modify the VIet-
nam bomblng. Thls ls In the New York Tlmes 
by Wllilam Beecher, JUly 24. "Johnson sa.ld 
he would rule out both cutbs and Wider 
raids." 
Secretary McNAMARA. I think you would 
have to aak Mr. Beecher for his sources. He 
did not dlsCUB8 the matter with me, a.nd I 
am sure he did not discuss It with President 
Johnson. 
Senator CASE. So fnr as you know 
there ls no Intention or-I am not putting 
thls ln personal terms but merely as an 
lllustratlon-taking Sen a tor Coopers' advice. 
Secretary McNAMARA. I do not mean to be 
less thnn candid here, but I should not, I 
think, give any Indication or future military 
opera tlons. 
Mr. President, I do not regard that 
reply as a responsible response to the 
suggestions made by the Senator from 
Kentucky and many other Members o: 
Congress. 
If the Secretary of Defense feels, and 
he may properly f!'el, that It Is beyond 
his authority, competence, and what Is 
appropriate and proper for him to talk 
about, and that It should be the Presi-
dent.'s prerogative to make response to 
this broad question-not about opera-
tions but about the broadest kind of 
American POlicy-so be It; but in that 
event It Is U1e President who must re-
spond, and I hope he will. 
Mr. COOPER. Mr. President, I appre-
ciate the comments of the Senator from 
New Jersey. One must recognize the dif-
ference between what I propose and the 
Senator from New Jersey proposes-and 
question of mU!tary policy. We are talk-
ing about a way to determine if the war 
can be ended. 
Mr SYMINGTON. Mr. President, w!ll 
the Senator yield? 
Mr. COOPER. I am happy to yield to 
my friend, the Senator from Missouri. 
Mr. SYMINGTON. Mr. President, the 
able Senator from Kentucky knows of 
my respect for him. Nevertheless, this 
address of his creates certain appre-
hensions In my mind that are fortified 
by a story in the press this afternoon 
entitled "VC Using New Rocket." The 
article states: 
Ualng a new rocket wenpon, Oommunlst 
guerrtlla.a today ltllled 11 Amerlcaru1 and 
wounded 43 more In attacking a U.S. oomp 
and B.lrtleld near SeJgon. 
TI1e Vlet,oong wlthln 25 rnlnuteB slammed 
137 shells Into the base. Military spokesmen 
118old the Oommunlsls used mortnrs and 122 
mm rockets, a new addition to the guerrilla 
arsenal. 
It hurls a SO-pound rocket 6 miles with 
dl'adly aecuracy, the US. spokesm&n aald. 
The rockets that have been killing so 
many marines around Da Nang, 1t ts my 
undprstanding, had a maximum range 
of 4.3 miles. 
THE Vlri'NAM WAlt A SUGGES'I'ION 
During the week before la.st, In Viet-
nam, U.S. casualties totaled 1,452, with 
1.170 wounded, and 282 killed. 
Nearly all Utese ca.sualt!es resulted 
from weapons shipped direct from North 
Vietnam to South VIetnam, or from 
North Vietnam through Laos and Cam-
bodia to South VIetnam. 
Despite that fact, there 1s continued 
Insistence, supported heartUy by the 
Communist,s all over the world, that the 
United States stop !t,s efforts to halt the 
flow of this lethal equipment at the 
source, by attacking mU!tary targets In 
North Vietnam. 
This opposition is centered In the 
phrase "stop the bombing;" and the in-
fluence of the campaign that has cen-
tered around that phrase has resulted 
ln much of our air and sea attack pro-
gram being more a matter of "form" 
than one of "substance." 
The death of every young American In 
combat is a sad and terrible business-a 
life, with all Its promise for the future, 
ended forever. 
We have recently received class!fled 
testimony before the Senate Armed 
Services Committee which pointed out 
that the ablllty of the North VIetnamese 
to bring down their heavier artillery dur-
Ing the bombing pause Incident to the 
Tet holiday caused the slaughter of many 
of these young Americans; and we have 
seen photographs, which are ava!lable to 
any Senator, which proved lt. 
It Is easier to direct this war from the 
Senate floor than from the battle sta-
tions of our fighting men just south of 
the DMZ, and all over South VIetnam. 
Over here, however, except for certain 
families, who grieve for the loss of their 
loved ones, It is a fact that we are giving 
up nothing; wherea.s over there, 12,000 
young Americans have given up every-
thing 
It is hard to understand why there 
would appear to be at least as much sol!c-
ltude for the lives and safety of North 
VIetnamese m!l1tary as against American 
m!l1tary and the lives and safety of 
young Americans who have been drafted 
from their schools and colleges and jobs 
by their Government, and who are fight-
ing with superb courage for their coun-
try, 10,000 miles from home. 
I do not know whether normal m!li-
tary attacks against North VIetnam can 
ever bring us any true "success" in this 
long and major war. But I do !mow that, 
unless the United States attempts to stop 
at the source the guns coming down from 
North Vietnam which are kUling Ameri-
cans In South VIetnam, there Is no 
chance whatever for any poos!ble success. 
Incidentally, but pertinent to overall 
thinking on this subject. the casualties 
of our South VIetnam allies during that 
same week totalled 556, whlch were less 
than 40 percent of U.S. casualties. 
After four trips to Vietnam, three of 
them In the last 18 months, It Is my 
belle! that the morale, the very fiber, of 
the South VIetnamese people has, to a 
considerable extent, withered away; 
eroded by over a quarter of a. century of 
almost cont!ImotL~ war-first with the 
Japanese, then with the French, then 
with ourselves and the South Koreans: 
and almost continuously among 
themselves. 
There are those who support the send-
ing of more American ground forces to 
South Vietnam. If we used the techno-
logical advantages of air and seapower, 
however, instead of such concentration 
on a ground war, based on my trips in 
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the theater, I am convinced that ~ 
would have more chance for success with 
less troops instead of more. 
Based on the above. let me make this 
suggestion this morning, 1f I may, Mr. 
President, that instead of the constant 
offer to have our Government stop air 
attacks against North Vietnam as a pre-
liminary to negotiation, we offer not only 
to stop the fighting in North Vietnam, 
but also the fighting in SOuth Vietnam-
and start negotiations from there. 
Surely that action would give us a 
better chance to attain these negotiations 
and we could then apply at least part 
of the appalllng cost of thls Vietnam 
war-already some $70 mllllon a day-
to our grave and growing problems here 
at home. 
Mr. President, I want to thank the able 
Senator from Kentucky for yielding to 
me. 
Mr. BYRD of Virginia subsequently 
said: Mr. President, a few moments ago 
the distlngulshed Senator from Missouri 
mentioned the casualties of the United 
States Forces and the South Vietnam 
forces. 
As I recall, he gave the figures for 1 
week. I would Ilk·~ to expand those fig-
ures and give at this point the figures 
for the first 5 months of 1967. 
In the first 5 months of 1967, the U.S. 
combat casualties totaled 31,036 kJlled 
and wounded. 
In -that same period the South Viet-
namese casualties totaled 17,003. 
Mr. COOPER. Mr. President, I have 
listened carefully to the remarks of the 
distlngulshed Senator from Missouri, but 
I must say that we are discussing differ-
ent approaches to a solution of the war. 
In a way, he made a strong argument 
for the proposal I am making. I have 
said that everyone knows that should 
there be a cessation of the bombing it 
would entail risks; the poSBibility of the 
introduction of additional forces and 
supplies from North Vietnam. But with 
the great strength we have in ground 
forces, and air forces, concentrating on 
those points where infiltration routes 
enter South Vietnam, I cannot see that 
the security of our forces will be threat-
ened any more than they are now. On 
the other hand-the cessation may lead 
to peace and greater security for our 
troops. 
I recall that it was in February or 
March of 1965 the bombing began. I be-
lieve we had 24,000 men in Vietnam at 
the time. There was no great movement 
of either men or supplies into South 
Vietnam. But as we have stepped up 
bombing, the entry of troops and sup-
plies into South Vietnam has increased. 
The movement of supplies and men into 
South Vietnam has not been stopped by 
the bombing. 
The Senator from Missouri speaks 
about-and rightfully ~f concern for 
those who fight. All of us have concern 
for our men in Vietnam. It is the greatest 
concern of all. 
The chief ·reason I have continued to 
make thls propooal is because of concern 
for those who fight, who are wounded, 
and who die. The present rate of casual-
ties today, could reach 75,000 a year. 
The Senator and I are not talking about 
the same thing. Of course, if we want to 
apply every bit of force we have upoo 
North Vletnam, and some would use 
nuclear weapons, we could destroy NOrth 
Vietnam. I have made roy propooal be-
cause I do not believe there has been an 
unconditional cessation of bombing. 
I propose tt again to determine if it 
will open negotiations. I propose it as a 
movement toward a honorable peace. 
If negotiations do not follow, the Pres-
ident of the United States has the in-
herent power, under the Constitution, 
to take whatever steps he needs to protect 
our troops. 
Mr. MANSFIF..LD. Mr President, will 
the Senator from Kentucky yield? 
Mr. COOPER. I am happy to yield to 
the Senator from Montana. 
Mr. MANSFIELD. I have listened with 
interest, and I have read with interest, 
the speech just made by the distinguished 
Senator from Kentucky. I want to com-
mend him for making hls views known 
once again He has a perfect right to 
speak out as he does, as every Senator 
has. When we speak out, it does not 
mean we are planning the strategy of 
the war iri Vietnam. The President has 
that responsibillty as Chief of State and 
as Commander in Chief. 
But, may I point out that every Sen-
ator from every State likewise has a 
responsibility, and the place to make hls 
views known is on the floor of the Senate 
in full and open view. 
May I say to the distinguished Senator 
from New Jersey-and I think I can say 
thls without fear of contradiction-that 
all proposals which have been made or 
suggested here have been given serious 
consideration in the executive branch of 
the Government. 
The Senator from Kentucky states 
that the chief issue before the country 
continues to be Vietnam. It is the over-
riding issue. While, for the time being, 
the situation in our urban areas and 
major cities is of prime importance, even 
there, in roy opinion, the shadow of Viet-
nam extends. 
As I listened to the remarks of the dis-
tinguished Senator from Kentucky, it 
appeared to me that what he has said in 
effect, this time, is what he said on May 
15. The only difference is that he has 
gone into more detail. But, as I recall the 
Cooper formula proposed on the floor ot 
the Senate on the 15th of May, it was to 
confine the bombing to the Ho Chi Minh 
trails around the 17th parallel. 
Thus, what he said then he is now say-
ing again : This is one way to confine the 
war to South Vietnam. 
I have assumed all along that our chief 
objective in Vietnam was to maintain the 
st ablllty, the integrity, and · the inde-
pendence of South Vietnam, period. 
Thls is one way in which more success 
can be achieved, in my opinion, than can 
be achieved by the continued bombing of 
the north where, I believe, our forces 
are rapidly running out of targets. 
What was the bombing of the north 
supposed to accomplish? It had two ob-
jectives. One, either to stop or decrease 
1nfiltration of men and material along 
the Ho Chi Minh trails, and, two, to 
bring Hanoi to the conference table. In 
both respects, those objectives have not 
been attained. There are more men and 
more tons of material coming down from 
the north than WBII the case before the 
bombing started, or at least before It 
achieved proportions of great s!gn:lfi-
cance. 
As far as bringing Hanoi to the con-
ference table is concerned, in roy con-
sidered opinion, it is farther away from 
that table than ever before. You cannot 
bomb those people into submission. You 
cannot return them to the stone age, be-
cause they are living in conditions not 
very far from it. They will dictate the 
kind of war which will be followed. 
whether tt be conventional or guerrllla. 
They have been dictating the kind of 
war and when it is to be fought. They 
have fought it all too often at the t1me 
and place of their own choice. 
What have we accomplished with our 
search-and-destroy tactics? We have 
taken, for a time, control of a part of 
their territory, but after we do that, we 
go back to our bases. There is even a 
question of doubt as to how secure our 
bases are. I would recall what happened 
last week, when a very small number of 
mortars shelled Da Nang. I read in the 
papers that our losses ranged from $60 
million to $80 million. 
The Senator from Kentucky also per-
fonns ·a service for the country when he 
points out what the possible potentials 
in this war are if it keeps going on, esca-
lating step by step, gradually or other-
wise. 
I am taking too much of the Senator's 
t1me. All I want to say is I think, once 
again, as he has many times, the Senator 
has performed a public service. 
Mr. COOPER. I thank the Senator. 
Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, will 
the Senator yield? 
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The time 
of the Senator has expired. 
Mr. COOPER. I ask unanimous con-
sent that I may have 10 additional 
minutes. 
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without 
objection, it is so ordered. 
Mr. COOPER. I yield to the Senator 
from Arkansas. 
Mr. FULBRIGHT. I merely wish to 
associate myself with what the Senator 
from Montana, the distinguished ma-
jority leader, has said, in commending 
the Senator from Kentucky. I read his 
speech with a great deal of interest. I 
join in hls recommendation to stop the 
bombing. Thls subject has been dis-
cussed at considerable length by the 
Senator from Kentucky in a slightly dif-
ferent context, but the purpose Is still 
the same, I think; it is to try to bring the 
war to an honorable end. 
I only say, with respect to the com-
ments of the Senator from Missouri, 1f 
he knows of any way to approach a ces-
sation of the fighting, I will join in that, 
too. The principal purpose of stopping 
the bombing is to set the stage for nego-
tiations which would leave both parties 
in an acceptable oolitical posture. That 
Is the purpose of negotiations. 
I think the Senator from Kentucky 
and I wish to bring about the same ob-
jective. It is a question of how to bring 
it about. I think the Senator from Ken-
tucky is correct in pointing out that we 
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have never had an unconditional cessa-
tion of bombing, We have never given a 
bona ftde te6t as to what the Intentions 
of North Vietnam are. We do not know 
what they would really do if there were 
a cessation of the bombing, without the 
specific conditions such as have been 
mentioned on many occasions. I would 
like to see us try it. 
I would also like to have a cease-fire, if 
someone would show me how to get it. 
That Is what was negotiated tn 1954, 
when the French and the Vietnamese 
were In agreement that the fighting 
should stop. I do not want to quibble 
about the methods that would promote a 
cessation of this war, but I think the 
Senator from Kentucky is most logical 
when he says we can do this without any-
one's agreement. We cannot get a cease-
fire without an agreement on the other 
side. We can cease the bombing without 
obtalntng anyone's permission and see 
what the other side will do. 
So I commend the Senator from Ken-
tucky. I hope that this suggestion might 
reach the executive branch of the Gov-
ernment. 
Mr. COOPER. I did not talk about a 
cease-fire or the subject matter of nego-
tiations, because I desired to emphasize 
the step that could lead to negotiations. 
As the Senator has said, this action is 
within our control. 
Mr. AIKEN. Mr. President, w111 the 
Senator yield? 
Mr. COOPER. I yield. 
Mr. AIKEN. I Just want to say the 
Senator from Kentucky has given us a 
display of a commodity which is all too 
scarce In the world today, and I mean 
statesmanship. There is nothing dishon-
orable about wanting to bring this war 
1n Southeast Asia to a close. I think 
President Johnson would be fully war-
ranted 1n taking heed of what the Sen-
ator from Kentucky has said today, 
How has our policy worked over there? 
We were supposed to bring the war to 
a quick end when the bombing of North 
Vietnam started. In fact, eome of our 
m11ltary experts thought It would be only 
a matter of a few days before the North 
Vietnamese leadership would be on Its 
knees seeking a conference at the table. 
It baa not worked just that way. 
Coincident with the start of the bomb-
ing of North VIetnam came the Intro-
duction of more modern and e:t'Hclent 
weapons on the part of the enemy. We 
have had a very painful experience as a 
result. By the end of this year, our cas-
ualties, killed and wounded, will un-
doubtedly reach 100,000 most of which 
will have been Incurred since the bomb-
Ing of North ' Vietnam started they 
might have been considered of minor 
proportions up to that tlm&-and we are 
st111 fighting In the same places we were 
when we started that bombing-a.~ the 
Senator from Missouri said, 4 miles from 
Da Nang and about the same distance 
from Saigon and our other bases In 
South VIetnam. 
We get optimistic reports and predic-
tions every little while, and they never 
come true. Only the other day, top of-
ficials of our Government assured us we 
w're making progress and alm06t the 
next day we got a report that one of our 
. 
air bases ha.d been attacked by modern 
weapons and possibly $100 m1111on dam-
age was done to our A1r Force 1n a 
single attack. 
I might say that when we follow a 
policy that does not work and has not 
worked, then It is time perhaps to try 
something else, such as the Senator from 
Kentucky has advocated. There Is no 
use saying that President Ho Chi Minh 
\s not sick of this war. He would not be 
human if he were not sick of it. It Is 
also a good guess to say that he and 
most of his countrymen would rather 
die than get down on their knees and 
beg. 
So I do hope the President will take 
heed of what the Senator from Kentucky 
has sugiested, not only today, but a 
number of times. It would be no disgrace 
for the United States to seek to bring this 
war to an end. 
Mr. CLARK. Mr. President, will the 
Senator yield? 
Mr. COOPER. I yield. 
Mr. CLARK. Mr. President, I should 
like to join Senators on bo•.h sides of the 
aisle 1n commending the Senator from 
Kentucky on the speech he has made 
today. I agree completely with every-
thing he has said. 
It Is dimcult to quarrel with a col-
league, particularly when he is a former 
Secretary of the Air Force, but I find 
myself in disagreement with some of 
the points made by our colleague, the 
Senator from Missouri [Mr. SYMINGTON), 
a few moments ago. 
He was, of course, Secretary of the Air 
Force. It was my privilege to have served 
for 4. years In that branch of the 
service during the war, attalntng the 
rank of colonel; but I do not pretend to 
have any particular competence with 
respect to the utilization of air power 
at the prCI\ent time. 
I must say, however, as an observer 
who did serve In the Air Force for 4 
years, that 1n my opinion the bombing 
has been counterproductive and has had 
very little to do with saving the lives of 
any young Americans. If lives are saved 
by bombing, they can still be saved, 1n 
my opinion, by bombing south of the 
17th parallel. 
On March 31, I 11Ulde statements quite 
simllar to those which the Senator from 
Kentucky has made today. On April 3, 
at the unanimous-consent request of the 
chairman of the Committee on Foreign 
Relations, the Senator from Arkansas 
I Mr. FuLBRICBrl, my speech was printed 
In the RECORD. Secretary General U 
Thant publicly espoused the recommen-
dations that I made, which were as fol-
lows: 
First. Cease the bombing of North 
VIetnam. 
Second. Cea.~ all offensive operations 
l.n South Vietnam, firing only 1f fired 
upon, 
Third. Induce General Ky's forces to 
do the same. 
I returned to the same subject on May 
16, In connection with the occasion of 
Buddha's birthday, making the 116me 
proposals. Those proposals have never 
been acknowledged nor commented upon 
by the executive branch of the Govern-
ment. 
I ask my friend from Kentucky this 
question: Does he not believe that the 
cessation of the bombing of North Viet-
nam, while It might very well result In 
negotiations with Hanoi, iB not too likely 
to have the effect of achieving negotia-
tions with the Vietcong; and Is It not 
necessary that 1! we make a peace ges-
ture toward Hanoi, we should also make 
a similar peace gesture toward the Viet-
cong? 
My suggestion would be that If we 
announced publicly we would fire only 
when fired upon, at least until we had 
an opportunity to determine whether the 
leadership of the Vietcong was interested 
In arranging a cease-fire, and would stop 
the search and destroy technique which 
Is costing the lives of so many young 
Americans and causing so many others 
to be wounded, we would then have a 
comprehensive plan which In my opinion 
would have a better chance of success; 
for I am not convinced, and I wonder 
whether the Senator from Kentucky is 
convinced, that Hl\nol completely dom-
Inates the Vietcong. 
Mr. COOPER. No, I do not think Hanoi 
completely dominates the Vietcong. The 
Vietcong were active for many yean be-
fore the war expanded. 
I have addressed myself to North Viet-
nam, because North VIetnam, In every 
proposal, has made as Its central point 
the unconditional cessation of bombing. 
As we all know from our own sources, 
their proposals have changed at times 
but always this has been the central 
point. 
I shall confine myself to tlie ques-
tion that I have raised this a.fternoon 
I do recall that the Senator from Penn-
sylvania, has suggested the same pro-
posal. 
I thank the Senator. 
Mr. DOMINICK. Mr. President, will 
the Senator yield? 
Mr. COOPER. I yield. 
Mr. DOMINICK. Mr. President, I had 
the privilege of reading the speech of 
the Senator from Kentucky, which he 
furnished to me before he gave it. I read 
It with considerable Interest and care. 
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Sen-
ator's time has expired. 
Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I ask 
unanimous consent that the Senator 
from Kentucky may have 5 a.dd!t!onal 
minutes. 
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without 
objection, it Is so ordered. 
Mr. DOMINICK. I must say, though 
I would like to agree with the Senator, 
that I find myself unable completely to 
agree. I say this because It seems to me 
that his proposal is predicated upon the 
Idea that North VIetnam wants peace, 
while there has been no sign of any kind 
that North Vietnam wants either to ne-
gotiate or to cut down Its rate of infil-
tration Into South Vietnam, or to other-
wise approach the peace table. 
We have probably made the most ex-
tensive effort to find a method of sitting 
down at a table with the North Viet-
namese that any country has ever made 
In time of war, nnd we have been unable 
to find any poss!bll!ty whereby they will 
even sit down and discuss the matter. 
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I was in South Vietnam and Thailand 
in May. There was certainly no indica-
tion then that the North Vietnamese 
were moving in a direction which would 
cut down on their involvement in South 
Vietnam. As a matter of fact, during one 
of the holidays, we were informed by 
both intelligence and diplomatic sources, 
and by our ministry-I was personally 
so informed-that the road south looked 
like the Los Angeles freeway on New 
Year's Day; that when we stopped the 
bombing, truckload after truckload and 
convoy after convoy, which up to that 
time had been held back and were only 
dribbling through at night, were coming 
down, with vast sources of supplies and 
equipment to be put into South Vietnam. 
In addition to the 112-millimeter rocket 
which has been talked about by the dis-
tinguished Senator from Missouri, there 
were 144-millimeter rockets, now being 
made available by the Russians, which 
are capable of going 7 miles or more 
before they hit. 
I would say there was no indication 
under any circumstances that they 
would be willing to seek peace. If we stop 
our bombing-and this 1s what concerns 
me most--without having at least some 
kind of word that they are willing to 
stop and sit down and see how we can 
find peace; if we stop without even that 
assurance, it strikes me that what we 
will be doing is experimenting with the 
position of our troops in South VIetnam. 
That is why, much as I should like 
to, I am unable to agree with the Senator 
from Kentucky. 
Mr. COOPER. Mr. President, I appre-
ciate the comments of the distinguished 
Senator from Colorado. 
As he has said, there has not been any 
open or public indication upon the part 
of North Vietnam to negotiate. We know 
that the President of the United States 
has undertaken many courses to try to 
get to the table. 
But this being true, I have asked that 
before we start on another stage of in-
creased; buildup of forces, of increased 
bombing, Increased casualties, of in-
creased costs, all of which are not bring-
ing the war to a close, we should see If the 
one requirement made again and again 
by North Vietnam, the unconditional 
cessation of bombing, will lead to nego-
tiations and peace. 
Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, will 
the Senator yield? 
Mr. COOPER. I yield. 
Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I 
have :Wtened to this debate this after-
noon with a great deal of interest. It 1s 
well that the different points of view 
held by various Senators be brought 
forth. I appreciate the candor and the 
frankness of the distinguished Senator 
from Missouri [Mr. SYMINGTON]; I 
appreciate the reasoning and the 
thoughts behind the words of the dis-
tinguished Senator from Colorado [Mr. 
DoMINICK]. It 1s obvious that there are 
divergencies of opinion. But I believe 
that what we must face up t<- is that 
either we have to seek to find new ways 
of reaching the negotiating table, or face 
the prospect of escalating still further. 
There are not many more targets out-
side of Haiphong and Hanoi and per-
haps a few targets further north. If we 
are to continue to escalate, we had better 
count the costs involved-the cost to us 
In manpower, and how long it will take, 
what It may mean in the way of possible 
confrontation with China and perhaps 
the Soviet Union and other "socialist" 
states. 
I appreciate what the distinguished 
Senator had to say about a proposal 
which I made about taking up the U.S. 
resolution Introduced in January 1966 in 
the Security Council, seeking to bring 
all the participants, both direct and In-
direct, to New York, for the purpose of 
laying the cards on the table. When I 
speak of Indirect participants and direct 
participants, I mean Peking and the 
Vletcong-the NLF, the political arm. 
They both have to be considered, in my 
opinion, before this war 1s concluded. 
I say most respectfully to the Senator 
that perhaps it will not be one formula 
alone which will bring this war to a con-
clusion. At the least, it will be a con-
solidated and concentrated effort in 
South Vietnam. If the Cooper proposal 
Is followed, there is also a call for a pro-
posal to continue the defense perimeter 
just below the demilitarization zone, be-
low the 17th parallel-of which I under-
stand 11 miles has been built or cleared 
and an additional 12 miles 1s in the 
process of being constructed-that would 
take us more than half way across the 
17th .Parallel dividing North and South 
VIetnam. If that could be done, if the 
Cooper formula could be followed, and 
if the U.S. resolution to the United Na-
tions could be called up, followed up and 
voted on, perhaps there would be a pos-
sibility of finding a small pathway to a 
road which might lead towards negotia-
tions and peace. 
We cannot afford to let down In a 
constant effort to reach the negotiating 
table. 
I assure the Senate and the Senator 
that as far as the President of the Unit-
ed States is concerned he is just as desir-
ous as 1s anyone In this body of reaching 
the negotiating table to the end that this 
brutal and dirty war can be brought to 
an honorable conclusion. 
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